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Tactical Communication: Mutiny as a 
Dialogue in West and Central Africa 
Maggie Dwyer 
Abstract: This article expands our understanding of the objectives of 
mutinies through an analysis of trends in tactics. It explores actions within 
mutinies through a review of 66 cases of mutiny from 1960 to 2012 in 
West and Central Africa. Despite wide variations in context among these 
mutinies, there are remarkable similarities in the tactics used by mutineers 
in the region and across time. These commonalities challenge the popular 
image of African mutinies as chaotic or devoid of strategy. The article 
demonstrates that the most common tactics used by mutineers in West and 
Central Africa all serve to open a dialogue with leadership and provide a 
platform for soldiers to vocalize their expectations in an environment that 
intentionally stifles the voices of the junior members. It suggests mutiny be 
viewed as an act of communication rather than merely a form of insubor-
dination. 
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The media tends to portray mutinies as chaotic events that threaten pub-
lic order and safety.1 A sample of descriptors of African mutineers 
within international media include “ruthless”, “uncontrolled individuals”, 
“diehards”, “criminals” and “dangerous”, while the mutinies themselves 
have been characterized as “total anarchy”.2 Military organizations have 
an equally negative reaction to mutinies, often handing out harsh penal-
ties to those involved, including capital punishment. Elihu Rose (1982: 
562-563) describes the way militaries generally view mutinies: 
If governments abhor the word “mutiny”, the military does even 
more so, for the military’s ability to act effectively is founded upon 
the principle of discipline, and mutiny is the antithesis of discipline. 
To the military, mutiny is utterly unthinkable. It is more than a 
breach of regulations; it is a negation of the military essence.  
Rose’s description is similar to other writings on mutinies, which regularly 
use emotive expressions such as “dishonour”, “disloyalty” and “moral 
weakness” to describe the actions of mutineers (James 1987: 4). While 
some of these adjectives commonly used to describe mutineers may apply 
to some individuals, the often-dramatic depiction obstructs the rationale 
and strategy of a mutiny.  
Despite the strong reaction mutinies evoke, it is a topic that has been 
given little scholarly attention, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The few 
studies of mutinies on the continent are limited to individual case studies, 
such as the mutinies following independence in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.3 This research breaks 
from the tendency to address mutinies as singular, exceptional events and 
instead looks at patterns across states and time.  
The article addresses an issue that is absent in most discussions of 
mutinies: tactics. It asks a basic but important question: How do soldiers 
in West and Central Africa generally conduct a mutiny? However, the ar-
ticle serves as more than a playbook for mutinies. It aims to provide a 
more detailed understanding of the objectives of mutinies by analysing 
common tactics. 
The research question is approached through a review of 66 cases 
of mutiny from 1960 to 2012 in West and Central Africa. Despite wide 
variations in context among these mutinies, there are remarkable similar-
ities in the tactics used by mutineers in the region and across time. These 
commonalities challenge the popular image of African mutinies as im-
1  For example, see West Africa, 7 October 1991, 1675. 
2  West Africa, 4 November 1961, 1 February 1964, 9 July 1966. 
3  Examples include Parsons 2003; Luanda 1998; and Mazrui and Rothchild 1967. 
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pulsive or devoid of strategy. For example, they counter work by Geoffrey 
Parker and Guy Pedroncini, who each conclude that in the (Western) 
mutinies they studied, there were “few premeditated or purposeful acts of 
indiscipline. Instead, most mutineers acted out of despair, fatigue or mo-
mentary anger” (Parker 2001: viii). The analysis of mutinies in this article 
demonstrates that the most common tactics used by mutineers in West 
and Central Africa all serve to open a dialogue with leadership. Among the 
many potential ways for military members to express their discontent, 
mutineers regularly choose tactics that bring their complaints into the 
public realm. Their actions are showy and difficult for politicians or mili-
tary hierarchy to ignore. This analysis suggests mutiny be viewed as an act 
of communication rather than merely a form of insubordination. 
Identifying Mutinies 
Data for this article is drawn from a wider study on mutinies in Africa 
(Dwyer 2014). The research defines mutiny as “an act of collective in-
subordination, in which troops revolt against lawfully constituted author-
ity” (Rose 1982: 561) for primary goals other than political power. Using 
a range of sources, including a systematic review of Africa South of the 
Sahara, Africa Confidential, Africa Research Bulletin and West Africa, I identified 
incidents of mutiny in West and Central Africa from 1960 to 2012. Ad-
ditional information about the mutinies came from academic writing, 
memoirs and other news outlets, as well as declassified and leaked intelli-
gence reports. In reviewing these sources, I was looking for events which 
included a group of soldiers who 1) remain within the state’s military 
structure and 2) use mass insubordination to express stated grievances 
and goals beyond the desire for political power to higher political and 
military authorities. This is an intentionally conservative definition of 
mutinies that excludes other types of military indiscipline such as deser-
tion. By limiting the scope of indiscipline, the analysis focuses specifically 
on acts in which soldiers attempt to work within the system rather than 
simply leave the organization. The definition also separates mutinies 
from coups. In practice, various forms of military indiscipline can often 
overlap or escalate, and some acts that have started as mutinies have 
ended in coups. However, within the 66 cases examined, there were only 
eight for which this pattern occurred. This counters the way mutinies 
have often been seen – namely, as the entry point of a coup (First 1970: 
205; Luckham 1998: 23-24). Instead, the research looks at mutinies as a 
phenomenon with their own unique dynamics. 
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The study also involved qualitative field research in Sierra Leone, 
Burkina Faso and the Gambia (2011–2012) during which former muti-
neers, military leadership, politicians, civil society leaders and journalists 
were interviewed in regards to incidents of mutiny. This allowed me to 
gain unique insight into the perspectives of the individuals who con-
ducted or experienced the mutinies first-hand. Through this combination 
of primary and secondary research, I identified 66 cases of mutiny. A list 
of these mutinies can be found in Table 1. A file of available data on 
each of these incidents was created, and the qualitative-data-analysis 
computer software NVivo was used to help organize the data and iden-
tify patterns across time.4 
The later sections will detail patterns of tactics used by mutineers as 
identified through the review of these revolts. It is important to note that 
in the vast majority of mutinies examined, the participants were rank-
and-file soldiers. Occasionally, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were 
involved – and, more rarely, junior officers – but the bulk of participants 
were at the lowest rank of the military hierarchy. This is consistent with 
studies of mutinies in a non-African context (Lammers 1969: 558). The 
low status of these individuals within their professional environment 
likely shapes the tactics they choose as well as the objectives of the mu-
tiny, as will be further detailed.  
Revised View of Mutinies 
Mutineers typically make material demands, and in the context of West 
and Central Africa these usually include a combination of calls for in-
creased pay and improved living conditions. However, often the analysis 
of mutinies is limited to these material demands. This can be seen in the 
way that mutinies in Africa are commonly referred to as simply “pay 
revolts” or “pay mutinies”.5 These terms are usually not followed with 
4  The following countries are included in the dataset: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville, São 
Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Due to the lack of detail 
in reporting on most mutinies, it was not possible to accurately count each unit 
within large-scale mutinies. Instead, mass mutinies (such as those in the CAR in 
1996/1997 and Burkina Faso in 2011) were logged as separate incidents only 
when there was a clear pause (usually for negotiations) and later continuation of 
the mutiny.  
5  Examples include First 1970: 436; Cornwell 2000: 81-93; Peters and Richards 
1998: 184. 
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much explanation, as the cause and solution are both implied. As Chris-
topher Ankersen (2006: 123) explains, “many regard the lower ranks as 
unsophisticated” and “it may be easier, therefore, for their grievances to 
be viewed as basic and immediate”. 
Table 1: Incidents of Mutiny in West and Central Africa, 1960–2012 
Country Year Country Year Country Year 
DRC 1960 Gambia 1992 Nigeria 2000 
Ghana 1961 Niger 1992 Benin 2000 
DRC 1961 CAR 1993 CAR 2001 
Togo 1963 CAR 1993 Côte d’Ivoire 2002 
Liberia 1963 DRC 1993 Niger  2002 
Niger 1963 Côte d’Ivoire 1993 Burkina Faso 2003 
Congo-Brazzaville 1966 Niger 1993 Côte d’Ivoire 2003 
DRC 1966 CAR 1996 Guinea-Bissau 2004 
Nigeria 1966 CAR 1996 Burkina Faso 2006 
DRC 1967 CAR 1996 Burkina Faso 2007 
Nigeria 1970 Congo-Brazzaville 1996 Guinea 2007 
Benin 1972 Guinea 1996 Guinea 2007 
Sierra Leone 1982 Congo-Brazzaville 1997 Guinea  2008 
Burkina Faso 1983 Congo-Brazzaville 1997 Côte d’Ivoire 2008 
Côte d’Ivoire 1990 Burkina Faso 1997 Nigeria 2008 
Côte d’Ivoire 1990 Guinea-Bissau 1998 Guinea 2009 
Chad 1991 Niger  1998 Guinea 2011 
Gambia 1991 Côte d’Ivoire 1999 Burkina Faso 2011 
DRC 1991 Niger 1999 Burkina Faso 2011 
DRC 1991 Burkina Faso 1999 Burkina Faso 2011 
Benin 1992 Côte d’Ivoire 2000 Guinea-Bissau 2011 
Congo-Brazzaville 1992 Côte d’Ivoire 2000 Mali 2012 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
There is a growing consensus among mutiny scholars that we must look 
beyond “the mundane material grievances that have become cliché” in 
order to discover the less tangible motivations (Hathaway 2001: xv). One 
of these less tangible motives is a sense of injustice, which underlies 
most material grievances expressed through a mutiny. Mutinying soldiers 
usually draw on values concerning what they believe is unfair treatment 
and/or irresponsible behaviour by superiors within a military context. 
Their accusations against superiors often overlap with material demands. 
For example, soldiers demanding pay often specifically accuse their of-
ficers of having a hand in the delay and request their dismissal. Similarly, 
discrepancies in pay or opportunities between units are often attributed 
to wider issues of corruption and favouritism. While improvements to 
pay and living conditions often feature centrally in a list of mutineer 
demands, an important part of the revolt is the ability to reveal and dis-
cuss aspects of their conditions that they object to. The analysis in this 
research builds on works by scholars such as Craig Mantle (2004: 10), 
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who in observing Canadian mutinies commented that the acts “served as 
a means of communication that informed leaders that, for whatever 
reason, all was not well within their respective commands”. 
The desire to use a mutiny to explain to leadership-specific faults in 
the system is exemplified in the excerpt below from an interview with a 
former mutineer in Sierra Leone. This soldier accused his officers of 
“seizing government funds” that were meant to go towards pay and 
equipment for junior soldiers: 
Soldier: We just wanted to arrest those we [suspect] and hand 
them over. We wanted to expose them [senior officers]. 
Author: Expose them for what? 
Soldier: For embezzlement of government money. They are just 
eating this money. We wanted to expose them, to expose them so 
others do not do the same. If you expose them, you bring them to 
justice, they punish them for that. (Interview with enlisted soldier, 
Sierra Leone, 2012) 
This soldier’s explanation of the mutiny he was involved in is similar to 
rhetoric used by other mutineers in the region. For example, mutineers 
in 1993 in the DRC stated that their revolt aimed to “draw attention to 
the disgraceful situation” concerning soldiers’ pay (Africa Research Bulletin, 
February 1993, 10907). Salary was the key material complaint in both of 
the above examples, but the ability of soldiers to communicate and re-
veal the problems was another important objective of the action. By 
explaining where they find fault in the system, mutineers regularly at-
tempt to effect longer-lasting changes than a simple pay-off. The soldier 
quoted above believed that “exposing” the senior officers would deter 
other superiors from committing similar alleged crimes in the future. The 
desire to draw attention to their cause and open a dialogue about their 
conditions is not only apparent in soldiers’ rhetoric, but also demon-
strated in the tactics used by mutineers, as described below. 
The Power of a Threat 
In understanding how soldiers carry out a mutiny, it is important to note 
that while the threat of violence is an integral part of a mutiny, the use of 
violence is not. Of the 66 mutinies examined in this article, slightly less 
than half involved direct acts of violence. This data contradicts writings 
by other scholars researching militaries, such as Jimmy Kandeh (2004: 
42), who argues that “mutinies are by definition violent acts of defiance”. 
However, the finding from the cases reviewed in West and Central Af-
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rica is consistent with other studies of mutinies in a non-African setting, 
which have also shown that mutinies tend to be nonviolent (Rose 1982: 
568; Hathaway 2001: xvi; Hamby 2002: 576). 
An important aspect of mutineers’ strategy is the ability to create and 
control instability. Unlike those in an industrial or agricultural occupation, 
soldiers do not have tangible goods to demonstrate or measure their 
worth. Instead, the value of the military rests in its ability to manage vio-
lence (Huntington 1957: 13). Within this context, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that the threat of violence is a key tool for mutineers. Mutineers 
utilize their position in the military to threaten to create a situation of in-
stability or escalate the instability they have already created. Their main 
bargaining chip is their ability to also control the situation and cause cir-
cumstances to return to the desired state of stability. Yet, this is often an 
overly ambitious claim, especially when the group lacks cohesion. Anger, 
aggression and indiscipline can overshadow strategy, and individuals often 
act on their own accord. Involving large numbers of participants is often 
both the strength and the downfall of mutinies. A large group quickly 
gathers the desired attention and can place pressure on the government, 
but it is also difficult to control during a mutiny, when the standard hierar-
chy is often inverted.  
This article does not intend to downplay the violence that mutinies 
can cause. Even though the (slight) majority of mutinies in the region are 
not violent, there are several cases in which mutinies have led to high 
numbers of casualties. For example, in the mutinies in the Central Afri-
can Republic (CAR) in 1996 estimates of fatalities range from 200 to 500 
(Mehler 2009: 10). The Côte d’Ivoire mutinies in 2002 led to 270 deaths 
(West Africa, September 2002, 25), and mutinies in Guinea in 1996 re-
sulted in 50 deaths with a further 300 wounded (Africa Research Bulletin, 
February 1998, 13014). Significantly, many, if not most, of these casual-
ties were civilians. Therefore, although mutinies are usually seen as inter-
nal military matters, in West and Central Africa they have had severe 
consequences on civilian populations. It is important to develop a better 
understanding of mutinies, not just from a standpoint of political stabil-
ity, but also from a humanitarian perspective.  
While acknowledging the potential for violence in mutinies, this ar-
ticle aims to look beyond violent acts in order to demonstrate the wider 
strategy of mutinies. Mutineers generally want their conditions to im-
prove; they do not want to be removed from the military. At times, mu-
tineers recognize that violence will harm their cause and so they inten-
tionally demonstrate that they are unarmed. However, even in cases 
when soldiers indicate that they are unarmed, their position in an organi-
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zation that has often been responsible for much insecurity in the region 
implies a threat of violence or instability. As a result, governments usu-
ally act with more expediency towards a mutiny than they would if 
members of the civil service or a trade organization were presenting 
similar grievances (as is often the case when mutinies coincide with ci-
vilian demonstrations).  
Attention-Seeking Tactics 
An image that likely comes to mind of a mutiny in Africa is one of sol-
diers gathered in streets firing weapons into the air. This is a fairly accu-
rate starting point for a mutiny. Discharging firearms and holding mass 
gatherings in a strategic location (military headquarters, state house, par-
liament building, and so on) are among the most common tactics used 
by mutineers. The firing of weapons is closely linked to another com-
mon tactic: breaking into the armory. In most parts of West and Central 
Africa, junior soldiers do not readily have access to firearms and there-
fore the first step for many mutineers is to seize weapons and ammuni-
tion from the armory. Brandishing or firing weapons can serve as both a 
symbol of power and a threat to those not involved in the mutiny.  
While the image of mutineers as gun-wielding soldiers creating a cha-
otic atmosphere for their own benefit is partially true, it is also an incom-
plete picture. Mutineers are often strategic and creative in their tactics, 
gaining inspiration from their own military training as well as from suc-
cessful actions used by other armed groups and civilian organizations.  
One common tactic used by mutineers is hostage-taking. Of the 66 
mutinies examined in this dataset, at least 15 incidents involved the tak-
ing of hostages. This tactic is not specific to a particular time period. It 
was used in Congo-Brazzaville in 1966 when mutineers captured the 
head of the army and gendarmerie (West Africa, 2 July 1966, 757). This 
tactic was also used in the CAR mutinies in 1996 when mutineers took 
hostage the Army Chief of Staff, Energy Minister and National Assem-
bly Speaker (West Africa, 27 May 1996, 812). Nigerien soldiers appear to 
be the most keen on using hostages as a mutiny strategy and have done 
so during revolts in 1992, 1993, 1998, 1999 and 2002. Their abductees 
include the head of the parliament, ministers, military commanders and 
local authorities.  
Hostage-taking is also a common strategy among non-state armed 
groups in Africa, having been used by, for example, criminals in the Niger 
Delta, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and Somali pirates. However, it is 
not a strategy that would commonly be used in a military context. In hos-
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tage-taking by both armed groups and mutineers, the value of taking hos-
tages lies in the ability of that act to pressure an exchange. For example, 
armed groups usually attempt to exchange hostages for the release of pris-
oners or for money, while mutineers exchange hostages for meetings with 
senior leadership or promises that their demands will be met. One im-
portant aspect that makes hostage-taking by mutineers different from 
other armed groups is that they often abduct individuals from their own 
organization, whereas armed groups regularly go for external targets. Fur-
thermore, mutineers typically do not attempt to hide their identity or loca-
tion (as terrorists and pirates do). Last, mutineers usually do not overtly 
threaten the lives of their hostages. In the cases of hostages taken by muti-
neers examined here, there were no incidents in which the hostages were 
killed. Mutineers want to make changes to the military system or desire 
material gains; they do not want to be excluded and removed from the 
system. Therefore, they must use caution when dealing with hostages, as 
an injured or dead hostage would not help their cause.  
Mutineers also often take over strategic locations as a way to assert 
their power and threaten authority. The tactical value of the locations 
utilized by mutineers ranges from relatively minimal to extremely high. 
For example, mutineers in Nigeria in 2008 blocked traffic for several hours 
on a major road in order to draw attention to claims that they had not 
been paid their allowances (Sowole 2009). While the mutiny did bring 
attention to their complaints and likely inconvenienced many local people, 
it did not threaten the stability of the nation. Other mutineers have cap-
tured more valuable targets. Mutineers from the Air Force of the Côte 
d’Ivoire took over the control tower and terminals at the Abidjan Airport 
in 1990 (West Africa, 28 May 1990, 877-878). Similar incidents of mutineers 
holding airports have occurred in the DRC (1966, 1991) and Niger (1992).6 
Mutineers in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997 held both the rail station and the 
power station, disrupting rail service and leaving local towns without elec-
tricity for several days (Africa Research Bulletin, February 1997, 12578). 
Controlling public or strategically important locations is similar to 
hostage-taking in that it brings the grievances of the mutineers into a 
more public forum. Unlike hostage-taking, controlling locations affects 
not just key political or military personnel, but the general civilian popu-
lation as well. Targeting transit infrastructure, especially airports, also has 
international implications when air traffic is diverted. The longer muti-
neers hold strategically important locations, the more fragile a govern-
6  West Africa, 30 July 1966, 869; West Africa, 7 October 1991, 1674-1675; Africa 
Research Bulletin, February 1992, 10471. 
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ment appears, which could affect international trade and investments. 
Furthermore, when actions taken by mutineers affect civilians, there is 
the threat that civilians will react, further destabilizing the situation. Ci-
vilians may criticize the way the government handles the situation, or, 
perhaps even worse for a government, they may even side with the mu-
tineers. Both scenarios have occurred during separate mutinies in 
Burkina Faso, the former in 2011 and the latter in 1983.  
In addition to its strategic value, the choice of targeting transporta-
tion infrastructure can also be seen as mutineers working within a do-
main they are familiar with. While militaries worldwide often have a 
primarily external focus, in West and Central Africa the military regularly 
take on an internal function, similar to policing. The protection of key 
infrastructure is often part of their responsibility. It is particularly com-
mon for the military to be active in transportation infrastructure, as evi-
denced by military-manned road checkpoints or military personnel acting 
as airport security. 
Gathering publicly, firing weapons into the air, taking hostages and 
holding key infrastructure all serve the purpose of drawing attention to 
the cause of the mutineers. These tactics are not meant to be discreet; 
mutineers want people to know their mission. This is an important dif-
ference between coups and mutinies. Coups are generally intended to be 
exclusive (Kandeh 2004: 43), and “the conspiratorial strike is the secret 
to its success” (First 1970: 19). Mutineers typically want to include many 
participants and want both military and civilians to know about their 
cause. As I will describe later, soldiers often specifically threaten a mu-
tiny before one is carried out. Whereas coups are meant to be a definitive 
action, mutinies are a step in a process of negotiations.  
Media-Savvy Mutineers  
The above-mentioned mutineer tactics have been used fairly consistently 
from the 1960s to the present. A relatively new tactic that has emerged 
since the 1990s is the incorporation of media into mutinies. Radio has 
been the most preferred media outlet for African mutineers, which mir-
rors radio’s popularity across the continent. This trend of soldiers utiliz-
ing the radio coincides with and has been enabled by increased media 
freedoms in the region from the 1990s onward. During the 1990s, more 
media freedoms allowed reporters (though not without risk) to “reveal 
what [was] going on behind the well-draped windows of public institu-
tions” (Hyden and Leslie 2002: 12). There was increased public scrutiny 
of political figures and government procedures, with growing attention 
 Mutiny as a Dialogue in West and Central Africa 15 
towards corruption (Hyden and Okigbo 2002: 48). Many of the same 
themes were paralleled within militaries, which saw an unprecedented 
surge of mutinies in the 1990s (there were at least 28 in the region in that 
decade). Soldiers also publicly scrutinized their leaders and military pro-
cedures, often emphasizing corrupt practices.  
During the 1990s, it was common for mutineers to take control of 
the radio waves during their revolts. Several examples of this include muti-
nies in Côte d’Ivoire in 1990, Niger in 1992 and the CAR in 1996. How-
ever, in recent years mutineers have often not needed to physically take 
over a station to be heard. Media outlets vying for unique access often 
approach soldiers for interviews, as was the case during mutinies in Bur-
kina Faso in 2011 (Interview with Editorial Chief for Ouaga FM, 2012). 
The desire for mutineers to grab the attention of government offi-
cials, and often a wider audience, makes the media a natural tool. Radio 
announcements allow soldiers to articulate their demands. For example, 
in 1996 mutineers in the CAR made the following announcement: 
First, we demand the payment of overdue salaries for 1992, 1993 
and 1994. Second, the unfreezing of salaries. Third, the restoration 
and improvement of the Central African Armed Forces […]. 
Fourth, we demand that no legal proceedings should take place after 
the mutiny since we will stop today. (West Africa, 5 May 1996, 667) 
As earlier noted, mutineers also seek to open a dialogue about the con-
ditions under which they are working and often use radio announcements 
to provide detailed justifications for their actions. Radio statements by 
mutineers regularly provide an alternative narrative, one in which they are 
the victims of an unjust system rather than aggressors. For example, muti-
neers in the CAR stated the following in 1996: 
Our living conditions are mediocre; we are treated badly and we 
are exposed to disease. This is why we have left the barracks. We 
made these demands from our barracks, but call to no avail. We 
have been forced to take to the streets. We have no intention of 
destabilizing the regime. (West Africa, 5 May 1996, 667) 
The announcement serves to personalize the mutineers. They aim to 
portray themselves not as soldiers who are committing a military crime 
but rather as individuals who cannot provide for themselves or their 
families under their current salary. Additionally, they express that they 
used mutiny as a last resort and thus suggest that the blame is on their 
leadership for not responding to earlier complaints. 
Mutineers commonly present their case pragmatically, with a heavy 
emphasis on numbers and facts. For example, in interviews with former 
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mutineers in West Africa they often went to great lengths to explain their 
salary in precise numbers (including how often they were paid) as well as 
listing other various costs such as rice, a pound of meat, transportation to 
visit family, uniforms and boots.7 This is apparent in media announce-
ments by mutineers as well. For example, soldiers in the CAR announced, 
“We pay for our uniforms, which cost 25,000 francs [CFA]; a pair of boots 
costs 25,000 francs, and we get 29,041 francs and we have families and 
children” (West Africa, 5 May 1996, 667). The same group later explained 
on the radio, “We have continued to receive the salary of a second-class 
private, 29,041 francs, for 15 to 16 years” (West Africa, 5 May 1996, 667). 
Similarly, soldiers in Guinea in 2008 explained their pay grievances in rela-
tion to the cost of rice in order to show that a bag of rice costs roughly 
half of their monthly pay (Agence France-Presse 2008). In these cases, there 
seemed to be a strong desire to demonstrate in detail how their salaries 
could not cover the basic costs of living, and in doing so soldiers were 
making the point that their actions were driven by necessity. They provide 
a case for longer-term changes rather than a one-time pay-off. By provid-
ing the exact details of their salaries and expenses, soldiers also distin-
guished themselves from the officers whom they often accuse of eco-
nomic irresponsibility. However, portraying themselves as sensible negoti-
ators is likely to some degree a strategy in itself, and there are plenty of 
examples of behaviour within mutinies, such as looting, which cannot be 
justified by claims of necessity.  
While the above examples used media during a mutiny, there is a re-
cent trend of soldiers approaching the media with their complaints as a 
warning to the government of a pending mutiny. One such example 
involves Nigerian soldiers in 2012 during a deployment to Darfur as part 
of the United Nations/African Union mission. The soldiers told Radio 
France International Hausa Service that they would mutiny if they were not 
paid their owed allowances and airlifted back to Nigeria. In a related 
petition that they sent to the government, the soldiers stated:  
Nobody seems to listen to us or the plight of our families back 
home. Even though it is against the ethics of the military to go to 
the press, we are pushed to the wall because nobody listens to our 
cries apart from the media. (Mukhtar and Bashir 2012) 
In this case, the soldiers stress their desire to open a dialogue with their 
superiors and their willingness to take extreme measures to get attention 
for their concerns. Much like the examples from the CAR above, these 
7  Author interviews with military sources in Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and the 
Gambia in 2011 and 2012. 
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soldiers also acknowledge that their actions go against a military code of 
conduct but express that it was a measure of last resort. These examples 
further the notion that mutinies are often planned events rather than 
impulsive reactions. 
Similarly, soldiers in Sierra Leone used the media to express their 
complaints on a weekend radio show in October of 2013. A Sierra Le-
onean soldier deployed as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) accused the government of “fraudulently” reducing the 
peacekeepers’ pay and claimed that soldiers have to bribe officers to go on 
the mission.8 Among other complaints, he alleged that Sierra Leonean 
soldiers are living “precariously” on deployment, without adequate sup-
plies and food (Cham 2013). While the Minister of Defence responded 
that the claims were “unfounded” and “unprofessional” and questioned 
whether the caller was even a soldier, he still provided a detailed response 
to each of the claims (Awoko 2013). It is too early to tell if the peacekeep-
ers will be satisfied with his response, but the soldiers’ strategy of ap-
proaching the media with their concerns succeeded in opening a dialogue 
between themselves and senior hierarchy. Senior leadership clearly felt 
compelled to respond to the allegations, and it is possible that the response 
may have diffused tensions that otherwise could have led to a revolt. 
The rapid increase in internet use and particularly social media po-
tentially allows the messages of mutineers to reach much farther than 
radio announcements. Whereas the Nigerian and Sierra Leonean soldiers’ 
grievances were announced first on the radio, the stories were also 
posted online and picked up by bloggers and reposted via Twitter, thus 
reaching an incalculable number of people throughout the world. In 
another example from Nigeria, in 2013 a letter from an anonymous 
group calling itself the Group for the Salvation of the Nigerian Army 
and the Motherland (GROSNAMM) was widely circulated on blogs, 
internet message boards and Facebook, followed by hundreds of reader 
comments. The report detailed the career paths of dozens of senior 
officers and accused the Nigerian military of nepotism and ethnic fa-
vouritism within recruitment and promotions (among other things). It 
cautioned of growing tensions in the military and warned of a pending 
mutiny.9 Similar to the other cases, the authors of this report turned to 
new forms of media to disseminate their perceptions of alleged crimes 
and threatened to mutiny to hammer in their point.  
8  This was a common complaint I heard while interviewing Sierra Leonean 
soldiers in 2011 and 2012. 
9  iReports-NG.com is one of the many sites that posted the report.  
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Considering mutinies often involve junior rank-and-file soldiers, 
many of whom will likely be of a more technologically advanced genera-
tion than their older peers, it is reasonable to assume that technology and 
media will be used even more pervasively in future mutinies. Today, sol-
diers see media as more interactive and as a way to circumvent their chain 
of command. It also allows soldiers to connect with the international 
community and the civilian population. Some military hierarchies appear 
aware of the new challenges posed by the spread of information via social 
media and have sought to limit its use. For example, in 2013 the Nigerian 
military leadership warned soldiers against posting sensitive information on 
social media and asked those who are technologically savvy to help moni-
tor the social media activity of military personnel (Premium Times 2013). 
The growing trend of soldiers utilizing the media poses new chal-
lenges to military leadership because it contradicts the standard chain of 
command and allows complaints to circulate quickly. Expanding the 
dialogue beyond soldiers and their superiors into the civilian realm can 
also create challenges for political leadership. For example, there was 
criticism within the media, civil society and political opposition when 
President Tandja of Niger declared a state of emergency following the 
mutinies in 2002. The state of emergency restricted civil liberties, partic-
ularly press freedoms, and journalists who reported on the story were 
arrested (Africa Research Bulletin, July 2002, 14972-14975; IRIN 2002). The 
Constitutional Court ruled against Tandja and declared that he did not 
have the authority to make the decree (Africa Research Bulletin, September 
2002, 14999). Civilians stayed engaged with the mutineers’ cause and 
staged a sit-in in front of the Congress Palace in Niamey, where a con-
ference for the African Commission of Human and People’s Rights was 
being held to protest that over 200 mutineers had been held in jail for 
nearly a year without trial (Africa Research Bulletin, May 2003, 15317). The 
mutiny concerned pay and living conditions, as well as complaints about 
particular officers; however, it took on larger proportions when civilian 
organizations used the government response to question the powers of 
the president and the state of civil liberties.  
Mixed Results 
The goals of the tactics described above are to gain attention and open a 
dialogue with leadership in an environment in which the hierarchy does 
not easily allow individuals to express their opinions. Channelling concerns 
up the chain of command, which would be the required procedure within 
a military hierarchy, is rife with complications. For one thing, the chain of 
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command is often the problem, particularly when soldiers accuse their 
direct superiors of having a hand in their overdue or low salaries. Another 
complication arises when the demands of mutineers are larger than can be 
addressed by their immediate superiors, which is frequently the case. For 
example, a junior officer or NCO is generally not able to raise soldiers’ 
salaries or bring allegedly corrupt officers to justice.  
Most often it appears mutineers prefer to deal with political leader-
ship rather than military leadership. This is a trend that represents their 
general distrust of the military hierarchy. This preference can be seen in 
the way they often physically approach the state house or demand meet-
ings with the president. Their desire to negotiate with political leadership 
is also represented in their preference for abducting civilian political 
hostages rather than military officers. In some ways, this may be coun-
terintuitive. One could assume that rank-and-file soldiers would take 
hostage those that they blame for their problems, who tend to be mili-
tary officers. However, junior soldiers abducting their senior officers and 
expecting the military hierarchy to respond confines the act to an inter-
nal military matter and, generally speaking, the mutineers do not trust the 
military hierarchy. By involving political representatives, mutineers work 
around their chain of command and bring their complaints into the po-
litical realm. Additionally, they draw wider attention to the perceived 
wrongdoings of their seniors.  
The goal of many mutineers to engage with political leaders can also 
be seen as part of the history of militaries in the region. Here, militaries 
have long been intertwined with politics, as evidenced by the high num-
ber of coups and subsequently high number of military and former mili-
tary heads of state. Armed forces have long been involved in dialogue 
with politicians, and mutinies can be seen as an extension of this. Fur-
thermore, mutinies in West and Central Africa are generally successful in 
allowing soldiers the opportunity to directly engage with senior leaders. 
In most of the cases examined in this research, governments did not 
initially respond by attacking the mutineers; instead, they negotiated with 
the soldiers. In several cases, the mutineers were able to meet directly 
with the head of state, no small feat for junior soldiers.  
However, having a conversation is only one aspect of the goal, and 
soldiers also want senior leadership to actively address the issues raised 
in the discussion. While mutineers make their campaigns public, the 
negotiations with senior leadership tend to be conducted in private, and 
it is difficult for researchers to determine what soldiers receive in the 
negotiations. It appears that West and Central African mutineers are 
often successful in accruing at least some immediate gains (usually pay 
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and occasionally the dismissal of officers that the mutineers objected to). 
Yet, there is less evidence to suggest that mutinies often result in long-
term changes, such as major changes to the promotion system or signifi-
cant action against the corruption that mutineers often allege. One indi-
cation of the lack of long-term changes resulting from mutinies is the 
high number of recurrences. Burkina Faso, the CAR, Guinea and Niger 
have all experienced numerous mutinies in a relative short amount of 
time. Furthermore, the mutineers’ complaints are generally similar to 
those of previous mutinies, indicating that problems have not been ade-
quately addressed from the perspective of the junior soldiers. 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the tactics used in the cases of mutiny in this research 
challenges the way in which mutinies are often referred to as spontane-
ous acts. While there are certainly incidents within mutinies that are un-
planned, mutinies in West and Central Africa are usually not reckless re-
actions. Taking control of an airport, breaking into an armory, capturing 
hostages and strategic locations and making media announcements all 
require a degree of planning and coordination. The acts were often pre-
meditated, with soldiers regularly warning leadership ahead of time of the 
possibility of a mutiny. Furthermore, their objectives demonstrate a 
desire for more than basic and immediate demands.  
Through their public actions, they intentionally spread their message 
beyond the military realm. In doing so, they aim to open a dialogue with 
individuals outside their chain of command about the conditions under 
which they are working along with their grievances. This allows the sol-
diers to express their sense of injustice and at times to expose those that 
they hold responsible.  
Understanding common goals in tactics also helps anticipate future 
actions of mutineers. As many of the tactics have been consistently used 
since the 1960s, it is likely they will continue to be favoured by muti-
neers. The research has proposed that media, and new forms of media in 
particular, will be used increasingly in future mutinies. While military 
commanders and political leaders will likely be dismayed that soldiers are 
publicly airing their grievances to the media, the examples above have 
demonstrated that the tactic can help open a dialogue before soldiers 
resort to more severe actions. 
This article provides a broad look at mutinies and suggests a view of 
the actions that goes beyond acts of insubordination. It fills a gap in mu-
tiny literature by analysing mutineers’ tactics and how they have changed 
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over time. It should be noted that the available empirical data on mutinies 
is far from complete. This is due to difficulties in obtaining information 
such as the number of military personnel involved, fatalities amongst the 
mutineers and concessions given to mutineers, which are all usually mat-
ters of confidential military record. Yet, there is also work to be done with 
existing data. For example, future research could examine circumstances 
under which mutinies turn violent or study various government responses 
to mutinies. As mutinies have remained “one of the constants in the his-
tory of military organizations” (Callahan 2001: 119), research on the topic 
will likely remain valuable for our understanding of armed forces in the 
foreseeable future.  
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Taktische Kommunikation: Meuterei als eine Form des Dialogs in 
West- und Zentralafrika 
Zusammenfassung: Die Autorin analysiert den taktischen Verlauf und 
die Ziele von Meutereien in West- und Zentralafrika. Sie hat Aktionen von 
Meuterern in 66 Fällen von 1960 bis 2012 untersucht. Trotz erheblicher 
Unterschiede im Kontext konnte sie bemerkenswerte Ähnlichkeiten beim 
taktischen Verlauf feststellen, und zwar länderübergreifend und über den 
gesamten Zeitraum. Dieser Befund widerspricht der populären Vorstel-
lung, Meutereien in Afrika verliefen chaotisch und strategisch unüberlegt. 
Die am häufigsten verfolgten Taktiken dienten dazu, einen Dialog mit der 
Führung zu eröffnen sowie eine Plattform für die Soldaten zu schaffen, 
damit sie ihre Erwartungen formulieren können – in einem Umfeld, in 
dem die Stimmen untergeordneter Dienstgrade gezielt unterdrückt werden. 
Aus Sicht der Autorin sollte Meuterei eher als ein kommunikativer Akt 
interpretiert werden und weniger als eine Form des Ungehorsams. 
Schlagwörter: Westafrika, Zentralafrika, Militär, Aufstand/Revolte, Mili-
tär und Gesellschaft 
